Dramatic election results in Nepal have set the stage for a period of political realignment as the seventh government since the 2006 “People’s Movement 2” revolution attempts to advance the process of drafting a constitution. This new chapter in the country’s transition out of feudal, monarchical rule began when voters again went to the polls to elect a second Constituent Assembly last November 19. The Constituent Assembly is tasked with writing the new constitution.
The first Constituent Assembly was elected in 2008 with a two-year mandate, which was extended several times until finally expiring in 2012. A caretaker government led by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court ran the country until the most recent election, an arrangement that had dubious constitutional legitimacy.
Prior to the election, the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) suffered a major split. It had been the largest party in the first Constituent Assembly and led the 1996-2006 People’s War that culminated with the uprising that overthrew the monarch Afterwards, a long-running, intense internal debate erupted over what strategy the party should adopt.
One of the Vice-Chairmen of the UCPN(M), Kiran, led a faction that wanted to organize an insurrection in order to seize power—the line of “people’s revolt.” Chairman Prachanda and another Vice-Chairperson, Baburam Bhattarai, put forward the line of “peace and constitution,” arguing that the international situation and the level of economic development in Nepal were not conducive to an immediate socialist revolution. The Prachanda-Bhattarai leadership dissolved on humiliating terms the 10,000-strong People’s Liberation Army, which had in the past captured large swaths of the country from the royalist forces.
In mid-2012 these tensions led to a split, with Kiran leading a sizable minority out of the party and into a new formation, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist. While the UCPN(M) participated in the Constituent Assembly elections of 2013, the new party, the CPN-M, boycotted it, arguing that it would be incapable of solving the country’s political deadlock. The CPN-M further argued that it threatened the country’s sovereignty. Nepal is subjected to several “unequal treaties” that are economically and politically advantageous to India and the Indian government regularly intervenes in domestic Nepali affairs.
Despite a massive military mobilization to intimidate those who were calling for a boycott, participation in the second Constituent Assembly election was much lower than the previous one. Only 12.1 million voters registered, down 5.4 million from last time, and approximately 2 million fewer people ultimately voted. Corporate media outlets around the world reported the technically correct figure of 70 percent turnout—higher than the 2008 election—but this is because the number of registered voters was so much smaller. In one village in the Rolpa district, the heartland of the People’s War, not a single vote was cast.
The vote delivered a blow to the UCPN(M), which lost nearly two-thirds of its seats in the Constituent Assembly. Nepali Congress, a bourgeois centrist party, was the biggest winner, coming in first and gaining 81 seats over the last election. Meanwhile, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), which is a social democratic party despite its revolutionary-sounding name, increased its share from 108 to 175 seats for a second place finish.
The Madhesi political parties that advocate for the rights of the people living in the plains near the border with India saw their share of seats decline as a result of the many splits that occurred since 2008. Although they are not a communist force, the Madhesi parties raise the progressive demand of self-determination for oppressed nationalities, or as it is referred to in Nepal “identity-based federalism.” In a troubling development, the right-wing Rastriya Prajatantra Party improved on its results and is now the fourth largest party in the new Constituent Assembly, where it advocates for a return to the monarchy on the basis of Hindu fundamentalism.
In short, social-democratic, centrist and right-wing parties gained in the Constituent Assembly, while the progressive Madhesi parties and UCPN(M), having lost a large number of revolutionary cadres to the split and boycott, declined.
New government, same deadlock
The election led to the formation of a government, led by Nepali Congress Chairman Sushil Koirala, in coalition with the social-democratic CPN-UML. Although there was tension over allocation of cabinet positions, the two parties have a history of collaboration on the basis that both advocate for a “democratic” capitalist model and are hostile to those forces that seek to push further.
It appears that the deadlock that consistently bogged down the previous constitution-drafting effort will persist in the new government. The new Constituent Assembly was not convened until over two months after the election, due in large part to a dispute over whether the Prime Minister or President would preside over the ceremony inaugurating the assembly—an issue that eventually reached the Supreme Court. The Constituent Assembly still has not taken full shape, since the parties are yet to reach an agreement on how to allocate the appointed seats.
This may seem almost absurd, but the deadlock is an expression of the underlying causes of years of political stalemate between the contending class and political forces in the country. It is impossible to meet the demands and aspirations of the masses of Nepalese people without a radical transformation of property relations in the country, but the Constituent Assembly, filled as it is with pro-capitalist parties, will certainly not reach a consensus on such measures.
One of the committees, led by Baburam Bhattarai, the leader of the moderate wing of the UCPN(M) is tasked with reviewing the decisions of the last Constituent Assembly, but even this has been impossible. The Constituent Assembly only has a one-year deadline, but barring a major breakthrough it appears that Nepal is headed towards another missed deadline.
The new assembly seems even less likely than the last one to produce a pro-people constitution, which would address issues such as national self-determination and land reform. The People’s Liberation Army is gone, revolutionary forces are almost totally absent and other progressive forces have a diminished presence.
Sharp debate over how to complete the revolution
In this challenging situation, the communist forces have been engaged in heated internal debates over organizational and strategic questions. The departure of the left-wing Kiran faction did not end the divisions inside the UCPN(M). Sharp differences have emerged between the Bhattarai and Prachanda factions, with another third force led by another Vice-Chairman, Narayan Kaji Shrestha, usually aligning with Prachanda but with a heavier focus on nationalism.
This dispute came to a head at the UCPN(M) National Convention in early May. Meeting in the wake of the party’s disastrous performance in the election, the National Convention has the authority to elect party leaders but not to make fundamental changes to the party’s program. In reality though, rather seismic changes were proposed by party leaders.
At the national convention, Prachanda presented a political document that maintained the party’s existing position that the main task was to foster a “capitalist economic revolution” to combat feudalism and underdevelopment. He also proposed the dissolution of the party into a new communist formation by merging UCPN(M) with both CPN-M (the left-wing split), and CPN-UML (the social-democratic party).
Even though Prachanda’s proposal would essentially postpone socialist revolution indefinitely, Bhattarai stands further to the right, and his faction was still not satisfied. Bhattarai resigned his post as Vice-Chairman of the party prior to the National Convention in protest of Prachanda’s strategy and “working style.” His faction raised the demand for a General Convention, the highest decision making body of the UCPN(M), to adopt a “new ideology” for the party. Bhattarai uses the same language of “updating” Marxism that many formerly communist parties have used when they are preparing to abandon revolutionary politics. He also demanded a smaller, more streamlined central leadership and term limits for top leaders.
While the senior leaders were maneuvering for power, they had to deal with growing discontent among rank-and-file UCPN(M) cadre, who have many grievances with the entire leadership. High-ranking party officials have been accused of adopting a decadent lifestyle after the end of the armed struggle. Following the split, the cadres of the newly formed CPN-M participated in the landless peasants’ movement have targeted land owned by UCPN(M) leaders, expropriating them and distributing their property to the poor.
The issue of outright corruption has grown in importance. As a stipulation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the People’s War after the overthrow of the monarchy, revolutionary soldiers received a regular salary while they were confined to their barracks. They were instructed to give a portion of this salary to the party, but there has been little accountability as to how this money was ultimately spent. At the National Convention, delegates demanded that the leadership publicly release the results of an internal investigation into the matter.
Zigzags on the question of national sovereignty have disoriented and upset many UCPN(M) members. While Prachanda had in the past postured as a leftist in comparison with Bhattarai, often stressing the importance of combating Indian intervention, his position has dramatically changed now that he no longer faces pressure from the Kiran faction. Prachanda even went so far as to publicly congratulate Narendra Modi, the far right-wing politician who was recently elected as the new Prime Minister of India.
Ultimately, the Prachanda faction was able to garner the support of a large majority of convention delegates to endorse his political and organizational proposals. The Bhattarai faction boycotted the subsequent election process for the party’s Central Committee, Politburo, Standing Committee and senior officers. It remains to be seen whether or not UCPN(M) will suffer yet another split—this time from the right.
Rumors of a merger between UCPN(M) and CPN-M
In the run-up to the UCPN(M) National Convention, leaders of the Prachanda faction had insinuated that reunification with CPN-M was imminent. Prachanda himself stated that if it was necessary for communist unity he would be willing to resign his post and function as an ordinary cadre. Few take Prachanda’s statements seriously given the level of factional struggle. More likely, these overtures are meant to discourage defections to CPN-M, and shore up Prachanda’s support among left-leaning UCPN(M) members.
CPN-M leaders have stated fairly consistently that unification under the current circumstances is impossible, but that they would be open to the proposal if UCPN(M) adopts a revolutionary line and agrees to operate under Kiran’s leadership.
However, there is a growing debate inside the ranks of the CPN-M over if and when to return to armed struggle. The official line of the party is “people’s revolt on the basis of people’s war”—drawing on the experience and prestige of the People’s War to organize an insurrection in the urban centers of the country and seize power.
In the short-term, the CPN-M hopes to undercut the authority of the Constituent Assembly by agitating for a “round-table conference” that would be composed of all social and political organizations in the country to take up issues related to the new constitution.
One of the components of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to deal with civil and criminal grievances from the period of the People’s War. It was understood by revolutionaries that the balance of class forces would determine whether the commission would focus on prosecuting the atrocities committed by members of the old regime or instead attack communists for their actions against the ruling elites.
In a blatant violation of the peace agreement, the new government has brought charges against a group of UCPN(M) and CPN-M cadre for alleged murder. The prospect of an anti-communist witch hunt strengthens the case of CPN-M leaders who argue for the rapid development of a military wing for the party.
Depending on how these strategic differences within both UCPN(M) and CPN-M play out, there could be yet another political realignment. Even without a formal merger, a united front could emerge between the two large communist parties in the mass movement against the bourgeois NC-UML government.
Given the heroic sacrifices of the country’s millions of communists and ordinary people who have engaged in revolutionary struggle and taken to the streets, the popular aspirations for a new society, for socialism, will not simply disappear.
After overthrowing the monarchy, communist forces struggled to overcome the contradictions of how to preside over a bourgeois-democratic government in a largely feudal society while still advancing towards socialism. Now that the class character of the Nepalese state is more fully exposed, with bourgeois parties in the lead, a new stage of intensifying struggle is on the horizon.
