On Oct. 29, Brazilians re-elected incumbent president Luís Inácio “Lula” da Silva, or Lula, in a second round of voting. Lula garnered over 60 percent of the votes in the runoff against opposition candidate Geraldo Alckmin, four weeks after the first round.
Many reasons were given for Lula’s failure to secure 50 percent plus one of the votes needed to win in the first round.
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Despite these claims, the latest wave of scandals only had a limited impact on Lula’s first-round performance. Alessandra Alde, a political scientist at the University Research Institute of Rio de Janeiro, explained, “People are skeptical of their politicians and think they’re all the same, so these scandals always had a limited effect.” (San Jose Mercury News, Oct. 29)
The impact of opposition candidates on Lula’s campaign was more symptomatic than it was causal. Working-class confidence in Lula had begun eroding well before the 2006 electoral campaign got under way.
Historically, the strong bond between the PT and the masses had been a problem for the Brazilian bourgeoisie. As the most prominent force in the left opposition, the PT drew strength for many years from the frustrated aspirations of millions of Brazilian workers to attack the neoliberal agenda championed by its opponents.
However, once he assumed the presidency in 2003, Lula fully continued the fiscal and economic policies of the preceding government. In that context, the PT’s connection to the working class had a neutralizing effect on the class struggle: Neoliberalism remained the order of the day, while the PT used its influence with workers and grassroots organizations to appease their more radical demands with mild reforms and promises of future action.
Collaborating with the bourgeoisie
Where the PT was once a major thorn in the side of the bourgeoisie, it is now actively siding with them on major issues. Both Lula and Alckmin pushed pro-business platforms such as running primary budget surpluses and checking inflation, although Alckmin said he would more aggressively cut government spending.
Lula’s administration has clashed with Washington on some important matters—the stalemate in talks over the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is a prime example. Brazil is not a U.S. client state.
Its high level of regional influence combined with industrial development and economic strength occasionally permit the national bourgeoisie sufficient leverage to pursue policies at odds with the United States.
The Brazilian bourgeoisie, however, wants to maintain good relations with U.S. imperialism. And the significant comprador sector is always ready and willing to do the imperialists’ bidding. The Lula government has actively courted Washington to showcase Brazil as a reliable “partner” in hopes of securing a more prominent role for Brazil in the international arena.
The Brazilian-led U.N. occupation force in Haiti, for example, is an attempt to promote Brazil as a “stabilizing” force in Latin America—a force that can actively assist U.S. imperialism. Despite the lack of media coverage about this issue, the support of the Brazilian government for the oppression of the Haitian people has not gone unnoticed by Brazilian workers and grassroots organizations.
Lula’s fiscal policies have fully complied with the interests of the U.S.-dominated International Monetary Fund. Deference to the interests of finance capital has served not only foreign financial interests but domestic ones as well. Brazil’s interest rates, among the highest in the world, brought record profits in 2005 to Brazilian banks.
A report published by the Inter Trade Union Department of Statistics and Socio-Economic Studies in April 2006 showed that the four main Brazilian banks recorded a 49.9-percent increase in net profits for the year. Billions of dollars that are desperately needed for social programs are being diverted into the coffers of both domestic and foreign financial corporations.
To the extent that the Lula government has brought about reforms, they have fallen far short of Brazilian workers’ expectations.
Darci Frigo of the Land Rights Center stated, “The demands for a profound agrarian reform program advocated by the MST, the Landless Movement, were ignored. Some limited spending was directed to social and educational programs for the landless, but the large landed estates of the country were barely touched as the government encouraged agro-exports.” (MSTBrazil.org, Oct. 29)
The MST and the Unified Workers’ Central (CUT) recently led 17 social movements in crafting an action manifesto titled
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The MST and the CUT are the largest Brazilian organizations representing rural and urban workers. Their call to action reflects the disillusionment of many Brazilian workers and an unwillingness to idly wait for Lula to take action on their behalf.
Independent class struggle
The first-term policies of the Lula administration certainly reshaped the bourgeoisie’s orientation towards the PT.
In 2002, the possibility of a Lula victory brought uncertainty to both Brazilian and foreign capitalist interests. Now, Lula has earned the confidence of significant portions of the Brazilian ruling class, who feel their interests are in good hands. That support played a role in the latest elections, offsetting the negative impact of corruption scandals, opposition campaigns, and the damaged relationship between the PT and the working class.
Lula’s administration has provided some relief to the poor of Brazil. There are certainly voices to the right of the PT that oppose even the mild reforms instituted by Lula. And workers’ lives surely would not have improved a single iota under an Alckmin-led government.
Socialist Cuba and revolutionary Venezuela have welcomed Lula’s victory. This support stems from Lula’s relatively friendly posture toward these states. They had positive diplomatic relations and forged favorable trade pacts during Lula’s first term.
Alckmin, an overtly pro-U.S. politican, likely would have cooled relations with Cuba and Venezuela to appease the United States. But these countries’ support for Lula should not be confused with what is best for workers in Brazil. A revolutionary outlook for the Brazilian working class analyzes the class character of the government and orients toward class struggle and, ultimately, socialism.
Lula’s government is not oriented toward socialism. It is simply managing Brazil’s bourgeois-democratic capitalist system while extending some social benefits to the working class. His administration illustrates the limitations of social democracy.
Born in poverty, Lula was once a radical union leader and a major working-class voice against the military dictatorship in the 1970s. One would be hard pressed to find a political figure in Brazil whose roots more closely reflect the reality of millions of oppressed Brazilian workers, and yet even under Lula’s presidency the masses continue to struggle for the most basic concessions.
All reforms that benefit the Brazilian workers and the poor are welcome, but the class struggle, and not opportunistic politicians, has been the primary force behind those victories. The Brazilian working class must rely on its own strength and organization to defend its class interests.
