On Oct.2, 2006, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP), the largest guerrilla army in the Western Hemisphere, sent an open letter to the “three arms of public power”—the Colombian state—setting the stage for negotiations between the FARC-EP and the Colombian government.
The letter contained the parameters necessary for beginning negotiations. The first is a prisoner exchange that the
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The other conditions included creating a demilitarized zone in which the talks could take place, the suspension of orders for the arrest of the Central Command of the FARC-EP, recognition of the existence of the social and armed conflict, and the removal of the FARC-EP from foreign states’ terrorist lists, among other conditions.
Colombian President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, recently elected to a second term, has indicated a willingness to engage in negotiations. Whether the negotiations will take place is not certain, although the Colombian state and the FARC-EP seem to be moving in that direction.
The Colombian state—supported and funded by Washington—has been trying to exterminate the revolutionary forces of Colombia, including the FARC-EP, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and militant social movements, throughout the 42-year civil war.
It has conducted military operations against Colombian social movements for more years than the civil war itself. The state has utilized military attacks, covert operations, assassinations and proxy paramilitary forces to repress the Colombian people’s struggle for national liberation.
Negotiations have also been a key tactic of the Colombian state to demilitarize and render revolutionary forces irrelevant, as happened with the M-19 in the early 1990s. The Colombian state has also utilized negotiations when it is on the defensive and needs to revitalize its forces for another offensive.
The last round of negotiations between the FARC-EP and the government served this purpose. Then-president Andres Pastrana granted the FARC-EP a demilitarized zone and carried out negotiations from 1998-2002. During the time, the United States government poured large amounts of funding and training into the revitalization of the decrepit and corrupt Colombian military forces.
Negotiations can produce positive results for the revolutionary forces as well. For revolutionary Marxists, negotiating with the capitalist state is a tactical tool. In Colombia, the FARC-EP has used negotiations to carve out space where it can operate openly. Negotiations have also given the FARC-EP time to replenish and repair its military forces that have often been in constant armed battle with the state.
‘Plan Patriota’
Until recently, Uribe’s policy has been to carry out an all-out expansion of the war while refusing to consider any negotiations or prisoner exchange. Plan Patriota, designed by Washington and implemented by Uribe in 2003, has been the vehicle for this policy.
The Washington Office on Latin America called the plan, “the most ambitious counter-insurgency effort ever undertaken by the Colombian military.” The plan primarily targeted the peasant population that forms the FARC-EP’s rural base.
While the FARC-EP initially retreated in the face of this offensive against the population, it began an offensive in February 2005. Plan Patriota is not having its desired consequence—the FARC-EP and the Colombian social movements are still very strong.
Other factors have influenced the Colombian state’s decision to consider negotiations. The inability of all-out war to accomplish its stated objective—the destruction of the revolutionary movement—has been the decisive factor.
The FARC-EP has consistently called for a political solution to the social and armed conflict. Negotiations are part of the political solution to a conflict that has its roots not in armed violence but in capitalist exploitation and oppression. The FARC-EP has consistently resisted the demands of the Colombian state to demilitarize until those basic factors are addressed.
